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ABSTRACT
Health care extends life. Over the past half century, Americans have spent a rising share of total
economic resources on health and have enjoyed substantially longer lives as a result. Debate on
health policy often focuses on limiting the growth of health spending. We investigate an issue
central to this debate: can we understand the growth of health spending as the rational response to
changing economic conditions---notably the growth of income per person? We estimate parameters
of the technology that relates health spending to improved health, measured as increased longevity.
We also estimate parameters of social preferences about longevity and the consumption of non-
health goods and services. The story of rising health spending that emerges is that the diminishing
marginal utility of non-health consumption combined with a rising value of life causes the nation
to move up the marginal-cost schedule of life extension. The health share continues to grow as long
as income grows. In projections based on our parameter estimates, the health share reaches 33
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1. INTRODUCTION
The United States devotes a rising share of its total resources to health
care. The share was 5.2 percent in 1950, 9.4 percent in 1975, and 15.4
percent in 2000. Over the same period, health has improved. The life
expectancy of an American born in 1950 was 68.2 years, of one born in
1975, 72.6 years, and of one born in 2000, 76.9 years.
Why has this health share been rising, and what is the likely time path
of the health share for the rest of the century? We present a framework
for answering these questions. In the model, the key allocative decision
is the division of total resources between consumption and health care.
Utility depends on quantity of life (life expectancy) and quality of life
(consumption). Health spending is valued because it allows people to live
longer and better lives. In our analysis, the rise in the health share occurs
because of an income effect. As consumption increases with income, the
marginal utility of consumption falls rapidly while the value of extending
life rises. As agents in our model get richer and richer, consumption rises
but they devote an increasing share of resources to health care.
Many of the important questions related to health involve the institu-
tional arrangements that govern its nancingespecially Medicare and
employer-provided health insurance. One approach would be to introduce
these institutions into our model and to examine the allocation of resources
that results.
Instead, we take an alternative approach. We examine the allocation of
resources that maximizes social welfare in our model. This allows us to
abstractfromthecomplicatedinstitutionsthatshapespendingintheUnited
States and to ask a more basic question: from a social welfare standpoint,
how much should we spend on health care, and what is the time path of
optimal health spending? We look at these issues from two points of view,
rst under the hypothesis that historical levels of health care were optimalTHE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 3
and second under the hypothesis that they were not. In the second case, we
makeprogressbydrawingontheresultsofalargebodyofexistingresearch
on the value of a statistical life.
We start by documenting the aggregate facts for health spending and life
expectancy, the two key variables in our model. We then present a simple
stylized model that makes some extreme assumptions but that delivers our
basic results. From this foundation, we consider a richer and more realistic
framework and develop a full dynamic model of health spending. The
remainder of the paper estimates the parameters of the model and shows a
number of simulation results.
Our modeling approach is closest in spirit to the theoretical papers of
Grossman(1972)andEhrlichandChuma(1990),whoconsidertheoptimal
choice of consumption and health spending in the presence of a quality-
quantity tradeoff. Our work is also related to a large literature on the value
oflifeandthewillingnessofpeopletopaytoreducemortalityrisk. Classic
references include Schelling (1968) and Usher (1973). Arthur (1981) and
Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984) are more recent examples that include
simulationsofthewillingnesstopaytoreducemortalityrisk. Interestingly,
the simulations in these papers restrict attention to constant relative risk




We will be concerned with the allocation of total resources to health and
other uses. We believe that the most appropriate measure of total resources
is consumption plus government purchases of goods and services. That is,
we treat investment and net imports as intermediate products. Similarly,
we measure spending on health as the delivery of health services to the4 HALL AND JONES





































Note: The numerator of the health share is consumption of health services plus
government purchases of health services and the denominator is consumption
plus total government purchases of goods and services. For further information
on sources, see Section 5.
public and do not include investment in medical facilities. Thus we differ
conceptually (but hardly at all quantitatively) from other measures that
includeinvestmentinboththenumeratoranddenominator. Whenwespeak
of consumption of goods and services, we include government purchases
of non-health goods and services.
Figure 1 shows the fraction of total spending devoted to health care,
according to the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts. The nu-
merator is consumption of health services plus government purchases of
health services and the denominator is consumption plus total government
purchases of goods and services. The fraction has a sharp upward trend,
but growth is irregular. In particular, the fraction grew rapidly in the early
1990s, attened in the late 1990s, and resumed growth after 2000.THE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 5




































Note: Life expectancy at birth data are from Table 12 of National Vital Statistics
Report Volume 51, Number 3 United States Life Tables, 2000", December 19,
2002. Center for Disease Control.
Figure 2 shows life expectancy at birth for the United States. Following
the tradition in demography, this life expectancy measure is not expected
remainingyearsoflife(whichdependsonunknownfuturemortalityrates),
but rather represents life expectancy for an individual who faces the cross-
section of mortality rates from a given year.
Lifeexpectancyhasgrownabout1.7yearsperdecade. Itshowsnosignof
slowing over the 50 years reported in the gure. In the rst half of the 20th
century, however, life expectancy grew at about twice this rate, so a longer
times series would show some curvature. Whether life expectancy rises
linearly or less-than-linearly over time is somewhat open to debate in the
demography literature. Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) document a remarkable6 HALL AND JONES
linear increase in the upper tail of female life expectancy dating back to
1840. See Lee (2003) for an overview of this debate.
3. BASIC MODEL
We begin with a model based on the simple but unrealistic assumption
thatmortalityisthesameinallagegroups. Wealsoassumethatpreferences
are unchanging over time and income and productivity are constant. This
model sets the stage for our full model where we incorporate age-specic
mortality and productivity growth. As we will show in Section 4, the stark
assumptionswemakeinthissectionleadthefulldynamicmodeltocollapse
to the simple static problem considered here.
The economy consists of a collection of people of different ages who
are otherwise identical, allowing us to focus on a representative person.
Let x denote the person's state of health, which we will call health status.
The mortality rate of an individual is the inverse of her health status, 1=x.
Since people of all ages face this same mortality rate, x is also equal to life
expectancy. For simplicity at this stage, we assume zero time preference.




e (1=x)tu(c)dt = xu(c): (1)
That is, lifetime utility is the present value of her per-period utility u(c)
discounted for mortality at rate 1=x. In this stationary environment, con-
sumption is constant so that expected utility is the number of years an
individual expects to live multiplied by per-period utility. We assume for
now that period utility depends only on consumption; in the next section,
we will introduce a quality-of-life term associated with health. Here and
throughout the paper, we normalize utility after death at zero.
Rosen (1988) pointed out the following important implication of a spec-
ication of utility involving life expectancy: When lifetime utility is per-THE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 7
period utility, u, multiplied by life expectancy, the level of u matters a
great deal. In many other settings, adding a constant to u has no effect on
consumer choice. Here, adding a constant raises the value the consumer
places on longevity relative to consumption of goods. Negative utility also
creates an anomalyindifference curves have the wrong curvature and the
rst-order conditions do not maximize utility. As long as u is positive,
preferences are well behaved.
Rosen also discussed the following issue: If the elasticity of utility rises
above one for low values of consumptionas it can for the preferences
we estimate in this papermortality becomes a good rather than a bad.
A consumer would achieve a higher expected utility by accepting higher
mortality and the correspondingly higher level of later consumption. Thus
one cannot take expected utility for a given mortality rate as an indicator of
the welfare of an individual who can choose a lower rate. This issue does
not arise in our work, because we consider explicit optimization over the
mortalityrate. AnopportunityforimprovementofthetypeRosenidentied
would mean that we had not maximized expected utility.
The representative individual receives a constant ow of resources y that
can be spent on consumption or health:
c + h = y: (2)
The economy has no physical capital or foreign trade that permits shifting
resources from one period to another.
Finally, a health production function governs the individual's state of
health:
x = f(h): (3)
The social planner chooses consumption and health spending to maxi-
mize the utility of the individual in (1) subject to the resource constraint (2)8 HALL AND JONES
and the production function for health status (3). At the optimum, the
marginal benet of health spending, in extended lives, equals the marginal
cost. Here, and frequently in the rest of the paper, we measure costs and
benets in terms of resources per saved life. On the benet side, the utility
gainedfromsavingalifeisU(c;x). Totranslateunitsofutilityintounitsof





is the benet of a life extension that saves one life.
The marginal cost of saving a statistical life is dh=dm, where dh is the
increase in resources devoted to health care and dm is the reduction in the
mortality rate. For example, if reducing the mortality rate by .001 costs
2000 dollars, then saving a statistical life requires 1=:001 = 1000 people
to undertake this change, at a cost of 2 million dollars.
Our model contains health status x as an intermediate variable, so it is
useful to write the marginal cost as dh
dm =
dh=dx
dm=dx. Since health status is
denedasinversemortality,m = 1=xsothatdm = dx=x2. Intheprevious
paragraph,werequired1=dmpeopletoreducetheirmortalityratebydmto
save a life. Equivalently, setting dx = 1, we require x2 people to increase
their health status by one unit in order to save a statistical life. Since the
cost of increasing x is dh=dx = 1=f0(x), the marginal cost of saving a life
is therefore x2=f0(x).
Therst-orderconditionfortheoptimalallocationthatequatesthemarginal









f0(h); (6)THE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 9
and let s = h=y denote the share of resources devoted to health care. Then
the rst-order condition can be written as




The optimal allocation of resources makes the health share proportional to
the value of a year of life L=x as a fraction of per capita income. This
rst-order condition together with the production function for health status
and the denition of the value of life determine the optimal allocation of
resources in the model.
Nowsupposeweignorethefactthatincomeandlifeexpectancyaretaken
asconstantinthisstaticmodelandinsteadconsiderwhathappensifincome
grows. Despite this short-cut of using a static model to answer a dynamic
question,theresultsanticipatethendingsinourfulldynamicmodel. With
the value of life held constant, equation (7) implies that growing y would
causethehealthsharetodecline. Inotherwords,togetarisinghealthshare,
it must be the case that the value of a year of life, L=x, rises faster than per
capita resources y. This conclusion is true as stated if h is constant; if this
production elasticity falls as spending rises, then the value of a year of life
needs to rise even faster than income.








where c  u0(c) c
u is the elasticity of ow utility with respect to consump-
tion. This form of the optimality condition shows several results. First, the
health share depends on the ratio of the production elasticity to the utility
elasticity. We will argue that the key to understanding the rising health
share is that the utility elasticity falls as consumption rises. This decline
leads to a rising health share provided the health production elasticity does
not fall too rapidly as spending increases.10 HALL AND JONES
For a large class of utility functions, the utility elasticity declines as
consumptionrises. Forexample, thisoccursifu(c)isboundedorifu(c) =
logc. As we discuss later, for the kind of health production functions that
match the data, the production elasticity is either constant or declines. For
example, we will often assume a Cobb-Douglas health production function
such as x = (zh), where z is the productivity of health resources in
producing health status. This specication implies a constant h = .
Alternatively, the linear trend in life expectancy might lead one to favor a
production function such as x = log(zh), in which case the elasticity is
h = =x. In this latter case, the elasticity falls as life expectancy rises, so
one needs the utility elasticity to fall even faster.
Anotherremarkonthesolutiontothisbasicmodelrelatestotheroleofthe
health technology parameter z that we just introduced. Equation (8) shows
that the only way z affects the optimal health share is through the elastic-
ity h. For the Cobb-Douglas health production function, this elasticity is
invariant to z, so increases in health productivity do not affect the optimal
health share. Alternatively, for the semi-log specication, the elasticity
is h = =x, which declines as z rises. This suggests that technological
progress in the health sector can actually reduce the optimal health share,
other things equal. Stepping back, the general point is that our framework
doesnotputtechnicalchangeinthehealthsectoratthecenterofanexplana-
tion for the rising health share; we will discuss this more in the conclusion
to the paper.
We can also generalize the utility function to U(c;x). The solution for
this case is s=(1   s) = hx=c, where x  Uxx=U is the elasticity of
utility with respect to life expectancy. Our result, then, is that the health
share rises when the consumption elasticity falls faster than the product
of the production and life expectancy elasticities. As just one example
U(c;x) = xu(c) delivers a constant x even with sharply diminishingTHE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 11
returns to life expectancy (that is,  close to zero), so our main results
are unchanged in this case. In summary, our basic model suggests that
the health share rises over time as income grows if the joy associated with
living an extra year does not diminish as quickly as the marginal utility of
consumption.
3.1. An Example
To illustrate some of the principles of the analysis, we calibrate the static
model to U.S. data for 1950 and 2000. In the calibration, we ignore the fact
that the planner in both cases would understand that the economy is not
static and also that mortality is far from constant by age. We tackle both
of those issues in the next section. It will turn out that the static model is
similar to the full dynamic model with age-specic mortality.
Suppose that the ow of utility takes the constant-elastic form with an
additive constant:







 > 0. When 
 > 1, the realistic case, the base level
of utility, b, needs to be positive and large enough to ensure that ow utility
is always positive, so that the optimum occurs at an interior point. Notice
that in this case u(c) is bounded so that the elasticity c is decreasing in
consumption.
In the constant-elastic case, it is straightforward to show that the value










 > 1, the growth rate of the value of a life year approaches 
 times the
growth rate of consumption from above. Therefore, the value of a year of
life will grow faster than consumption if 
 is larger than 1. It turns out that12 HALL AND JONES
this is enough to get the value of a year of life to grow faster than income as
well. According to equation (7), this is one of the key ingredients needed
for the model to generate a rising health share.
Assume the health technology also takes a constant elasticity form
x = f(h) = A(zh); (11)
where z is the productivity of health resources in producing health status
andAisaconstant. Thisspecicationimpliesdiminishingreturnstoadding
resources in health care if  is below one.
Now we pick some parameter values for this utility function and the
production function for life expectancy. According to the data underlying
the gures at the beginning of the paper, resources per capita rose from
0.315 to 1.0 (as an index based in 2000), health spending rose from 0.016
to0.154(inthesameunits),andlifeexpectancyrosefrom68.2to76.9years.
Weassumethathealthproductivity, z, isnormalizedtooneintheyear2000
and grows at a constant exponential rate; as discussed later in the paper, we
assume this growth rate is one percent per year. Fitting the life expectancy
and health spending data to our health technology, equation (11), we nd
parameter values  = 0:0438 and A = 83:46.
Weestimatethecurvatureparameter,
,andthebaselevelofutility,b,for
the constant-elastic utility function by matching the rst-order condition to
the data in 1950 and 2000. Using the consumption, health spending, and
lifeexpectancydata, wesolvethetwoinstancesoftherst-ordercondition,
for1950and2000, forthetwoparameters. Wend
 = 1:71andb = 6:28.
Figures 3 and 4 show the results of the model simulation with these
parameter values. Because we chose the four parameter values to match
the beginning and ending data points for each gure, the simulation results
matchupnicelywiththedata. Projectingforward,thebasicmodelsuggestsTHE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 13











Health Share,  s
Circles o show actual data. The solid line shows the simulated values.














Circles o show actual data. The solid line shows the simulated values.14 HALL AND JONES
a health spending share of nearly 30 percent by the year 2050, when life
expectancy reaches 85 years.
The basic mechanism of the rising health share is straightforward. Be-
cause 
 is greater than one, the value of a year of life rises faster than
income. Life becomes increasingly valuable relative to consumption for a
society with these preferences.
WecancalculateexactlyhowvaluablelifebecomesbycomputingL(c;x)
in the simulation. For the year 2000, the model implies a value of life of
$8.1 million (in 2000 prices). We will discuss the empirical literature on
the value of life in a later section, where we will conclude that this value
is probably at the upper end of the reasonable range. Taken at face value,
the model implies that aggregate health spending in 2000 was at roughly
the right levelif we believe the true value of life in 2000 was around $8
millionorwastoohighbyroughlyafactoroftwoifinsteadthetruevalue
of life was $2 million.
The simple model develops intuition, but it falls short on a number of
dimensions. First, the model assumes constant total resources and con-
stant health productivitywe have been outing these assumptions in the
simulations by letting these grow. Second, the model assumes a constant
mortality rate at all ages. Finally, as we will show, in the full dynamic
model with age-specic mortality, the value of life is substantially lower.
4. THE FULL DYNAMIC MODEL
We turn now to the full dynamic model, allowing age-specic mortality
and the associated heterogeneity, as well as growth in total resources and
productivity growth in the health sector. This model also incorporates a
quality-of-life component associated with health spending.
Anindividualofageainperiodthasanage-specicstateofhealth, xa;t.
As in the basic model, the mortality rate for an individual is the inverse ofTHE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 15
herhealthstatus. Therefore,1 1=xa;t istheper-periodsurvivalprobability
of an individual with health xa;t.
An individual's state of health is produced by spending on health ha;t:
xa;t = fa(ztha;t); (12)
where zt is an exogenous productivity factor that converts spending on
health ha;t into effective health input. Note that we allow the production
function for health to depend on agemortality varies by age because of
variationsinhealthinputandvariationsintheeffectivenessofhealthinputs
in raising health status.
Thestartingpointforourspecicationofpreferencesistheowutilityof
the individual, ua;t(ca;t;xa;t). In addition to depending on consumption,
the ow utility of an individual also depends on her health status, xa;t.
Spending on health therefore affects utility in two ways, by increasing the
quantity of life through a mortality reduction and by increasing the quality
of life.
Forreasonsthatwillbecomeclearintheempiricalsection, wealsoallow
ow utility to depend on both time and age. For simplicity, we assume the
time and age effects are additive, so that
ua;t(ca;t;xa;t) = ba;t + u(ca;t;xa;t) (13)
Hereba;tisthebasevalueofowutilityforapersonofageaandu(ca;t;xa;t)
is the part that varies with the current consumption and health status. Fur-















, , and  are all positive. The rst part of this function is the
standardconstant-elasticspecicationforconsumption. Weassumefurther16 HALL AND JONES
that health status and consumption are additively separable in utility (this
implies, for example, that consumption will not depend on health status),
and that quality of life is a constant elasticity function of health status.
In this environment, we consider the allocation of resources that would
be chosen by a social planner who places equal weights on each person
alive at a point in time and who discounts future ows of utility at rate .






Na;tt (ba;t + u(ca;t;xa;t)): (15)
The optimal allocation of resources is a choice of consumption and health
spendingateachagethatmaximizessocialwelfaresubjecttotheproduction
function for health in (12) and subject to a resource constraint we will
specify momentarily.
It is convenient to express this problem in the form of a Bellman equa-
tion. Let Vt(Nt) denote the social planner's value function when the age
distribution of the population is the vector Nt  (N1;t;N2;t;:::;Na;t;:::).

















N0;t = N0; (19)
yt+1 = egyyt; (20)THE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 17
zt+1 = egzzt; (21)
and subject to the production function for health status in equation (12).
The rst constraint is the economy-wide resource constraint. Note that we
assumethatpeopleofallagescontributethesameowofresources,yt. The
second is the law of motion for the population. We assume a large enough
populationsothatthenumberofpeopleageda+1nextperiodcanbetaken
equal to the number aged a today multiplied by the survival probability.
The third constraint species that births are exogenous and constant at N0.
The nal two constraints are the laws of motion for resources and health
productivity, which grow at rates gy and gz.
Let t denote the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint. The
optimal allocation satises the following rst order conditions for all a:








+ ux(ca;t;xa;t)f0(ha;t) = t: (23)
That is, the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal utility of
health spending are equated across people and to each other at all times.
Thisconditiontogetherwiththeadditiveseparabilityofowutilityimplies
that people of all ages have the same consumption ct at each point in time,
but they have different health expenditures ha;t depending on age.
Let va;t  @Vt
@Na;t denote the change in social welfare associated with
having an additional person of age a alive. That is, va;t is the social value
of life at age a in units of utility. Combining our two rst-order conditions,
we get a new version of the optimal allocation condition that we derived












As in the earlier static model, the optimal allocation sets health spending at
each age to equate the marginal benet of saving a life to its marginal cost.18 HALL AND JONES
Themarginalbenetisthesumoftwoterms. Therstisthesocialvalueof
life from the preference side, va+1;t+1=uc. The second is the additional
quality of life enjoyed by people as a result of the increase in health status.
The marginal cost is the same as beforerecall that the squared value of x
arises in translating changes in health status x into mortality 1=x.
Finally, by taking the derivative of the value function, we nd that the
social value of life satises the recursive equation:






va+1;t+1 + t(yt   ct   ha;t): (25)
The additional social welfare associated with having an extra person alive
at age a is the sum of four terms. The rst is the base level of ow utility
enjoyed by that person. The second is the adjustment for the quality of life
associated with the current consumption level. The third is the expected
socialwelfareassociatedwithhavingapersonofagea+1alivenextperiod,
where the expectation employs the survival probability 1 1=xa;t. Finally,
the fourth term is the net social resource contribution from a person of age
a, her production less her consumption and health spending.
4.1. Relation to the Static Model




can be written as
V (y) = max
c;h
b + u(c) + (1   1=f(h))V (y) s.t. c + h = y: (26)
Given the stationarity of this environment, it is straightforward to see that
the value function is just
V (y) = max
c;h




We organize the data into 20 ve-year age groups, starting at zero and
ending at 99. We consider 11 time periods in the historical period, running
from 1950 through 2000.
We obtained data on age-specic mortality rates from Table 35 of Na-
tional Vital Statistics Report Volume 51, Number 3 United States Life Ta-
bles, 2000, December 19, 2002, Center for Disease Control. This source
reportsmortalityratesevery10years,withagebreakdownsgenerallyin10-
yearintervals. Weinterpolatedbytimeandagegroupstoproduceestimates
for 5-year time intervals and age categories.
Weobtaineddataonage-specichealthspendingfromMeara,Whiteand
Cutler (2004). These data are for 1963, 1970, 1977, 1987, 1996, and 2000.
We distributed national totals for health spending across age categories,
interpolated to our 5-year age categories.
We obtained data on national totals from Table 2.5.5 of the revised Na-
tional Income and Product Accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
accessed at bea.gov on February 13, 2004 (for private spending) and Table
3.15 of the previous NIPAs, accessed December 2, 2003 (for government
spending). Data on government purchases of health services are no longer
reported in the accounts.
The empirical counterpart for our measure, y, of total resources is total
privateconsumptionplustotalgovernmentpurchasesofgoodsandservices,
from the sources described above.20 HALL AND JONES
6. ESTIMATING THE HEALTH PRODUCTION FUNCTION
We begin by assuming a functional form for the production function of
health:
xa;t = fa(ztha;t) = Aa (ztha;t)
a : (28)
Notice that we allow the parameters of this production function, Aa and a,
to depend on age.
We also need to specify how the productivity of the health technology
changes over time. Recall that we assume exponential improvement over
time at rate gz:
zt = z0egzt; (29)
and normalize the level of z in the year 2000 to one.
Our procedure is to use outside evidence on gz and then to estimate Aa
anda fromdataonhealthspendingandmortality. Evidenceonthevalueof
gz is limited to case studies of particular disorders. These studies estimate
price declines of more than 1 percent per year, but are selectively chosen.
A key contribution of these studies is to adjust for quality change. Cutler,
McClellan,NewhouseandRemler(1998)ndthattherealquality-adjusted
priceoftreatingheartattacksdeclinedby1.1percentperyearbetween1983
and 1994. Shapiro, Shapiro and Wilcox (1999) estimate a real annual rate
ofdeclineof1.5percentforthepriceoftreatingcataractsbetween1969and
1994. Berndt, Bir, Busch, Frank and Normand (2000) nd that the price
of treating acute phase major depression declined at an annual rate of more
than 3 percent between 1991 and 1996. See Jones (2003) for the details
underlying these numbers. We consider a benchmark value of gz = :01.
This value implies that technical change in the health sector has proceeded
at a rate that is one percentage point faster than technical change in the rest
of the economy.THE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 21
Because health spending has grown at an annual rate of about 4.5 per-
cent, our assumption of gz = :01 amounts to assuming that increased
health spending accounts for just over 80 percent of the average decline in
mortality between 1950 and 2000. [add something about the 20 percnet]
We considered increasing gz to capture a trend in other determinants of
mortality, but we could not nd evidence of any other determinants that
might have trended consistently over this period. One natural candidate is
changes in smoking behavior, but this is probably better captured as rst
increasing and then decreasing over our sample period and therefore would
not explain much of the overall trend.
To estimate Aa and a, we take logs of the production function in equa-
tion (28) and add an error term:
logxa;t = logAa + a log(ztha;t) + a;t: (30)
Ouridentifyingassumptionisthattheerror,a;t,hasmeanzeroandnotrend.
Accordingly, we use a GMM estimator based on the two orthogonality
conditions of zero mean and zero covariance with a liner trend variable.
Because ha;t is strongly trending, the trend instrument is strong rather than
weak and the resulting estimator has small standard errors.
Figure 5 shows the GMM estimates of a, the elasticity of health status,
x, with respect to health inputs, zh, by age category. The groups with
the largest improvements in health status over the 50-year period, the very
young and the middle-aged, have the highest elasticities. The fact that the
estimates of a generally decline with age, particularly at the older ages,
constitutes an additional source of diminishing returns to health spending
as life expectancy rises.
Figure 6 shows the actual and tted values for two representative age
groups. Because the health technology has two parameters for each age22 HALL AND JONES
























































Note: The height of each bar measures the elasticity, a, in the specication logx =
logAa + a log(zh). Standard errors are shown at the top of the bars.
intercept and slopethe equations are successful in matching the level and
trend of health status. The same is true in the other age categories.
From these estimates, we can calculate the marginal cost of saving a life
at each age. However, before turning to these calculations, it is helpful
to have in mind a summary of the empirical literature on the value of a
statistical life (VSL).
6.1. Evidence on the Value of a Statistical Life
In evaluating our results, three dimensions of the VSL literature are rel-
evant. We are interested in (i) the level of the VSL, (ii) the rate at which
the VSL changes over time, and (iii) how the VSL varies with age.
Most estimates of the level of the value of a statistical life are obtained
by measuring the compensating differential that workers receive in more
dangerous jobs. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) provide the most recent survey ofTHE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 23






























































Note: The curving lines show actual health inputs zh on the horizontal axis and
health status, x, on the vertical axis, for two age groups, 35-40 and 65-70, for
the period 1950 through 2000. The smooth lines shows the estimated functions,
logx = logA + log(zh).24 HALL AND JONES
this evidence and nd estimates of the value of a statistical life that range
from $4 million to $9 million, in year 2000 prices.
Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) provide an alternative approach to
estimating the VSL. Their research design exploits the fact that states took
differential advantage of the relaxation of federal mandatory speed limits
that occurred in 1987. They nd that a much lower number of 1.5 million
dollars (in 1997 prices) represents an upper bound on the VSL, suggesting
that various problems including omitted variable bias and selection prob-
lems account for the higher estimates in the labor market literature.
How does the value of life change over time? Recall that a rising value
of life is crucial in this model to understanding the rising health share.
Unfortunately, there is relatively little empirical evidence on changes in the
value of life over time.
Costa and Kahn (2003) appear to provide the rst estimates from a con-
sistent set of data on changes in the value of life in the United States. They
use decennial census data from 1940 to 1980 and estimate the value of a
statistical life in 1980 of 5.5 million dollars (in 1990 dollars). Moreover,
they nd that this value has been rising over time at a rate equal to between
1.5 and 1.7 times the growth rate of per capita GDP. Hammitt, Liu and
Liu (2000) made a similar study for Taiwan, combining a time series of
cross-sections, and they estimate an elasticity of the value of a statistical
life with respect to per capita GDP of between 2 and 3. Because life ex-
pectancy itself grows relatively slowly, these studies therefore support the
key requirement in this paper that the value of a year of life as a ratio to per
capita income is rising over time, and provide an estimate of how rapidly
the rise occurs.
A different approach to estimating changes in the value of life nds the
opposite result, however. In addition to surveying the existing literature
that estimates the value of life at a point in time, Viscusi and Aldy (2003)THE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 25
also conduct a meta-analysis to estimate the elasticity of this value with
respect to income. Looking across some 60 studies from 10 countries, they
regress the average value of life estimates from each study on a measure of
average income from each study and obtain an estimate of the elasticity of
the dollar value of life with respect to income of about 0.5 or 0.6, with a 95
percent condence interval that is typically about 0.2 to 0.8. This appears
tobeconsistentwithseveralotherestimatesfromdifferentmeta-analysis
studies that are also summarized by Viscusi and Aldy.
Some additional insight on this issue comes from looking back at our
model. Recallthatequation(10)inthesimplemodelsuggeststhatthevalue
of life as a ratio to life expectancy is roughly proportional to consumption
raised to the power 
. That is, in units of output, the value of a year of
life grows with c
. One way of thinking about 
 is that it is the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which recent empirical work
estimates to be less than one. This suggests that 
 > 1, and in fact the
values that Costa and Kahn (about 1.6) and Hammitt, Liu, and Liu (about 2
or 3) nd accord well with this interpretation. Kaplow (2003) puzzles over
the low income elasticity estimates from the meta-analysis literature for a
similar reason; the recent empirical work by Costa and Kahn and Hammitt,
Liu, and Liu helps to resolve this puzzle, we think.
Finally,weturntoevidenceonvariationinthevalueofastatisticallifeby
age. Aldy and Viscusi (2003) summarize the existing empirical literature,
which primarily consists of contingent valuation studies. They go on to
providetheirownage-specicestimatesusingthehedonicwageregression
approach. Qualitatively, they support the contingent valuation literature in
nding an inverted-U shape for VSL by age. Quantitatively, their main
nding is that the value of life for a 60-year old is about 5.5 million dollars,
while the value of life for 30 to 40-year olds is about 2.5 to 3.0 million
dollars, a gradient of about 1/2 across these age groups.26 HALL AND JONES
To summarize, we take the following stylized facts from the VSL litera-
ture. First, there is substantial uncertainty regarding the level of the VSL:
it could be as low as 1.25 million in the late 1980s, but could range much
higher to numbers like 5 million or more. These numbers are plausibly
interpreted as the value of life at some average age, which we will take to
be the 35 to 39-year olds. Second, recent estimates suggest that the VSL
grows over time, at a rate something like 1.6 or 2 times the growth rate of
income. Finally, it appears that the VSL varies with age in an inverted-U
pattern, witharelativelygentleslope, fallingbyabout1/2betweentheages
of 35 and 60.
6.2. The Marginal Cost of Saving a Life
Our estimates of the health production function allow us to calculate
the marginal cost of saving a life, given the observed allocation of re-
sources. Recall, from the discussion surrounding equation (24), that this
marginal cost is x2=f0(h). With our functional form for the health tech-
nology, f0(h) = x=h, so the marginal cost of saving a life is hx=. It is
important to realize that this calculation only involves the health produc-
tion function. For this part of the paper, the preference side of the model is
irrelevant.
Table 1 shows this marginal cost of saving a life for various age groups.
We can interpret these results in terms of the three ndings from the empir-
ical VSL literature. First, the marginal cost of saving the life of a 40-year
oldintheyear2000wasabout1.4milliondollars. Thislinesupreasonably
well with lower end of the level estimates from the literature, for example,
the numbers from Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004). This would suggest
that health spending was at approximately the right level as a whole for
this age group in 2000. Alternatively, of course, if one believes the higherTHE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 27
TABLE 1.
The Marginal Cost of Saving a Life (thousands of 2000 dollars)
Growth
Age 1950 1970 1990 2000 Rate
0-5 10 60 310 430 7.7
10-15 140 480 2,060 4,690 7.1
20-25 410 1,310 2,580 3,240 4.1
30-35 310 760 1,460 2,900 4.5
40-45 120 240 780 1,370 4.9
50-55 60 130 490 810 5.4
60-65 30 130 390 680 5.9
70-75 30 100 420 590 6.2
80-85 30 120 470 560 6.1
90-95 30 160 520 570 5.6
Note: The middle columns of the table report the value of a statistical life for various age
groups. The estimates are calculated as the marginal cost of extending life, hx=, using
theestimatesof giveninFigure6andusingactualdataonhealthspendingandmortality
by age. Standard errors for these values based on the standard errors of a are small. The
Growth Rate column reports the average annual growth rate between 1950 and 2000.
estimatesoftheVSLfromtheliterature,thecalculationfromTable1would
suggest that health spending for this group was too low.
Next, thenalcolumnofthetableshowsthegrowthrateforthemarginal
cost of saving a life. These growth rates are high, on the order of 5 percent
per year or more. By comparison, the empirical VSL literature nds sig-
nicantly lower growth rates. Taking income growth to be about 2 percent
per year, for example, the income elasticity from Costa and Kahn (2003)
of about 1.6 suggests that the VSL grows at a rate of 21:6 = 3:2 percent
per year. This implies that the value of life in 1950 or 1960 would have
been much higher than the marginal cost of saving a life. Therefore, we
mayhave been spendingtoo little onhealth priorto themostrecent decade,
even taking the level of the VSL from the lower end of the estimates.28 HALL AND JONES
TABLE 2.
The Marginal Cost of Saving a Life, Per Year of Life Saved
Age 1950 1970 1990 2000
0-5 0 1 4 6
10-15 2 8 32 73
20-25 8 26 48 59
30-35 8 18 33 64
40-45 4 8 22 38
50-55 3 6 19 30
60-65 2 8 22 36
70-75 3 11 36 51
80-85 6 23 79 93
90-95 21 77 237 267
Note: The numbers in this table are the marginal cost of saving a life in thousands of 2000
dollars, from Table 1, divided by life expectancy at each age. Life expectancy for this
calculation follows the vital statistics denition. That is, it is computed using the cross-
section of mortality rates for a given year. Therefore, the values for young ages are likely
to be overestimates.
Finally, in terms of variation by age, the general pattern of the marginal
cost of saving a life matches the inverted-U shape found in the VSL litera-
ture. Quantitatively, the slope of the relation appears to be slightly steeper
than what that literature nds. Another way of saying that is this: if the
value of life at age 60 is really as high as half of that at age 30, then we may
be spending too little on health at higher ages. Similarly, it appears that the
marginal cost of saving a life at very young ages is so low that additional
spending at those ages might be worthwhile.
Another way of looking at these results appears in Table 2. This table
reports the marginal cost of saving a life, per year of life saved. That is,
it shows the numbers from Table 1 divided by life expectancy at each age.
For example, the marginal cost of saving an extra year of life at age 50 is
about 30 thousand dollars. Interestingly, the cost of saving a life year in
the youngest age category is only about 6 thousand dollars, while the costTHE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 29
for saving a life year for the oldest ages rises to well above 100 thousand
dollars.
7. ESTIMATING THE PREFERENCE PARAMETERS
Wepresentresultsfortwoapproaches. Thersttakestheobservedlevels
ofhealthspendingasoptimalandestimatesthepreferenceparameters. The
second estimates preference parameters from the evidence in the empirical
VSL literature; it implies that health spending has been inefciently low
during the last half century.
7.1. Estimation Using the First-Order Condition
Our model contains the following preference parameters: the discount
factor , the base levels of ow utility ba;t, the consumption parameter

, the quality-of-life parameter , and the weighting parameter . For
the moment, we consider the case where health status does not affect ow
utility so that  = 0. We will reintroduce this quality-of-life consideration
shortly.
We have explored a variety of parametric restrictions on the base utility,
ba;t. These include making it a constant for all ages and years, making
it vary by age, and giving it a trend over time. The evidence in favor of
age effects is strong. There is evidence of trends in base utility, but not
at the same rate for different age groups. We have not found a useful
parametric restrictioncandidates such as a set of age effects and a set of
time effects result in sufciently large residuals that the other parameters
take on improbable values.
Accordingly,wetreatthevaluesofba;t asparametersthemselves,without
imposing any restriction. Because there is one of these parameters for each
data point, estimation is a matter of solving for the values, not minimizing
a GMM norm or other criterion. Further, this means there are not enough30 HALL AND JONES
equations to estimate the other two parameters,  and 
. We use outside
evidence on these parameters before solving for the values of ba;t.
With respect to the discount rate, we use the following approach: the
Euler equation for consumption with constant-elastic preferences is
ct
ct 1
= [(1 + r)]
 (31)
where  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (see, for example,
Hall (1988)). We take its value to be 0.5, in line with a substantial amount
of research on this subject over the past two decades. r is the real return
to saving, which we take to have the value 0.05see Hall (2003) and the
research cited there. The value of  that reconciles the observed growth
rate of consumption per person over the sample period 1950-2000 of 2.08
percent per year is 0.992, or, for the 5-year intervals in the model, 0.963.
For the utility curvature parameter 
, we look to other circumstances
where curvature affects choice. First is intertemporal choice, as just dis-
cussed. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution, , is the reciprocal of
the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption. If marginal
utility is quite elastic, diminishing marginal utility of future consumption
inhibits trading off future for current consumption and the intertemporal
elasticity is low. If we make an analogy between valuing future consump-
tion for the purposes of choosing its level and valuing the enjoyment of
future live for the purpose of choosing health spending and thus choosing
mortality, then we would relate our curvature parameter 
 to the reciprocal
of , suggesting a value of 2. This value is also not too different from the
value of 1.7 we calculated in section 3.2.
Theseconddimensionofchoiceisoveruncertainoutcomes. Risk-averse
consumers will apply a concave utility function to those outcomes. If the
utility function has a constant elasticity, the elasticity of marginal utility is
thecoefcientofrelativeriskaversion. Lucas(1994)discussestheevidenceTHE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 31
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Note: Each line shows the cross section of base levels of utility in a period. The
periods cover 5 years each from 1950 through 2000.
on this parameter and concludes that 2 is a reasonable value. Again, if we
make an analogy between choosing among risky outcomes and evaluating
the benet of the value of future life, we would relate our curvature param-
eter 
 to the coefcient of relative risk aversion, once more suggesting a
value of 2.
Given the data and the values of a, , and 
, we rst calculate the
implied value of life from equation (24) and then recover the base levels
of utility from a rearranged version of equation (25). Figure 7 shows the
results of the calculations. Each line portrays the base level of utility for
every age group in a particular year, for the 11 years at 5-year intervals
from 1950 though 2000. The lines share a common patternnegative ow
utilityintheyoungestgroupandusuallyinthesecond-youngestgroup, and32 HALL AND JONES
also negative ow utility for teenagers. Negativity of ow utility does not
contradict any principles of the model. The motivation for continuing to
live is to capture next period's value of life. Negative ow utility marks
a difcult period of life that people choose to live through so that they
can enjoy later periods with positive utility. For older people, ow utility
stabilizes at a common, lower positive level over all periods. Flow utility
rises somewhat for the very elderly.
Wecouldalsointerpretthesolvedvaluesforba;t astheresidualsfromthe
rst-order condition in a model with a constant b. Economically, they arise
because the marginal cost of saving a lifethe right side of equation (24),
with values shown in Table 1varies considerably more across ages than
the value of life on the preference side would in the absence of variation in
b. That is, with a constant b across ages, the value of life on the preference
sidethe left side of equation (24)turns out to be relatively at across
ages. For example, consider the marginal cost of saving a life reported
in Table 1. The only way the model can make sense of the fact that we
spend so little on health care for children from 0 to 4 and so much on those
between 5 and 9 is by having a substantially lower b for the younger group.
Thesecalculationsprovideestimatesofthebaselevelofutilityduringthe
historical period. For our projections for the next 50 years, we need future
values of the base utility parameters. For this purpose, we make use of
additional information, namely the level of the value of life in utility units
from equation (24) in the last historical year, 2000. This level information
is not used in the calculation of the historical values of ba;t from equation
(25), which is in difference form. To make use of the level information,
we hypothesize that ba;t will not change over the future from its values in
2000. This hypothesis makes sense, because there is no systematic trend
in the historical values in Figure 7. Then we proceed in the following way:
When we solve the model for the years 2000 through 2095, we treat ba asTHE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 33
FIGURE 8. Comparison of historical average base utilities and values
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Solved
Historical average
Note: The dashed line is the average of all of the lines in Figure 7 and the solid
line is the set of base values of utility inferred from the value of life in 2000
a set of unknowns to solve and then require that the model solution match
the value of life in 2000.
Figure8comparestheresultsofthetwoapproaches. Thesolidlineinfers
the future values of ba from the year-2000 values of life and the dashed line
is the average of all of the historical lines in Figure 7. Except for the more
erratic values for the younger groups, the match is quite good.




given and compute the value of life at each age, va+1;t+1=uc, from these
data. For future values of health spending by age, we project the existing34 HALL AND JONES
dataforwardataconstantgrowthrate. Untiltheyear2020, thisgrowthrate
is the average across the age-specic spending growth rates. After 2020
we assume spending grows at the rate of income growth. (The rate must
slow at some point; otherwise the health share rises above one. Our results




the estimate from Ashenfelter and Greenstone of a value of life for 3539
yearoldsof$1.25millionin1987. Weprojectthisbackto1950andforward
to 2000, using a growth rate of 1:6  2:31 = 3:70 percent per year, based
on the Costa and Kahn income elasticity. By matching the value of life
for this age group in 1950 and 2000, we obtain b = 13:90 and 
 = 1:584
for the case where health status does not affect ow utility (i.e.  = 0).
Finally, we recalibrate the time discount factor  to an interest rate of 5
percent based on this new value of 
.
7.3. The Quality-of-Life Parameters
We know of no empirical literature that allows us to determine values
for the quality-of-life parameters  and . We therefore calibrate these
parameter values in the following way. Consider the following question:
What fraction of consumption would a 60 year old be willing to give up in
ordertohavethequalityoflifeimpliedbythehealthstatusofa35yearold?
Similarly, what fraction of consumption would an 85 year old be willing to
give up in order to have the quality of life implied by the health status of a
60 year old?
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where we assume that ~ x is the new health status purchased by giving up
consumption.
To calibrate our parameters, we assume the 85 year old would be willing
to give up 60 percent of her consumption to have the health status of a 60
year old, and the 60 year old would give up 20 percent of her consumption
to have the health status of a 35 year old. At a baseline value of 
 = 2,
these data points yield parameter values of  = 1:64 and  = 2:05. As a
check, these parameter values imply that a 35 year old would give up just
under 6 percent of her consumption to have the health status of a 20 year
old.
8. SOLVING THE MODEL
We now solve the model over the sample period 1950 through 2000 and
also project the economy out to the year 2050. We solve the model using
both of our approaches to calibrating the preferences parameters (the ba;t
and 
) and using two approaches to the quality of life ( = 0 and  > 0).
Whenwe recalibrateourotherpreferenceparameterstothe > 0case, we
nd in the rst instance values of ba;t that look very similar to those shown
in Figure 7. In the second instance where we match the literature's value
of life estimates, we obtain b = 14:516 and 
 = 1:575, values very close
to the original case of  = 0.
For the historical period, we take resources per person, y, at its actual
value. For the projections, we use the historical growth rate for the sample
period,2.31percentperyear. Duringthehistoricalperiod,weusetheactual
agedistributionofthepopulationinthemodelsolution. Fortheprojections,
we get the age distribution in year t by applying the model's mortality rate
from the previous year to that year's population by age. At the moment, we
project births to be a constant 4 million per year and ignore immigration;36 HALL AND JONES
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Circles o show actual data for the health share. The upward-sloping lines for the period
2005-2050 show the projected health share based on the full model where the VSL is
inferred from the health technology, as in Table 1. The gently sloping lines for the period
1950-2050 show the hypothetical historical and projected share for preferences inferred
from the VSL literature. Within these two approaches, the upper line corresponds to the
case that includes a quality-of-life term ( > 0), while the lower line does not ( = 0).
in the future, we should improve on these assumptions. The details for the
numerical solution of the model are discussed in the Appendix.
Figure 9 shows the calculated share of health spending over the period
1950 through 2100. For the historical period, the gure also shows the
actual share.
The rising health share observed in the data is a robust feature of the
optimal allocation of resources in the health model. For both approaches,
we nd that the optimal allocation of resources involves a rising health
share. The key force at work in the model behind this result is that theTHE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 37
marginal utility of consumption falls rapidly. Intuitively, spending an extra
dollar on consumption yields a gain of u0(c), which goes to zero quickly,
while spending an extra dollar on health yields a gain of vf0(h)=x2. This
term also goes to zero, of course, but if the value of life is growing over
time, the decline is slower.
It is important to be clear that this occurs as consumption is rising in
all years. Consumption grows, but at a rate that is slower than the rate of
income growth. As we get richer and richer, the most valuable thing we
have to purchase is more time to live.
Thegureshowsasubstantialdifferencebetweenprojectedhealthshares
for the two approaches. Our rst approach would match the actual health
share between 1950 and 2000 exactly. The projection based on that ap-
proach implies a rapidly growing health share in the future, reaching 34
percent in 2050. The second approach, based on the VSL estimates in the
literature, produces a much atter health share. It suggests underspending
on health for the last 50 years. The optimal health share rises gradually in
the future, reaching only 27 percent in 2050.
Figure10showstheactualandprojectedlevelsoflifeexpectancyatbirth.
FortheprojectionbasedoninferringtheVSLfromactualspendingandour
estimated health technology, the projected path does not grow quite as fast
as historical life expectancy. The slowdown is the result of the decline in
the elasticity of health status with respect to spending, a, at high ages. It
is also interesting to notice how similar the predicted life expectancies are
in the year 2050, despite the relatively large differences in health spending
observed in Figure 9. The reason is again related to the relatively sharp
diminishing returns associated with health spending.38 HALL AND JONES
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See notes to Figure 9. Life expectancy is calculated using the cross-section distribution
of mortality rates at each point in time.THE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 39
9. CONCLUSION
A relatively standard economic model yields a strong prediction for the
healthshare. Providedthemarginalutilityofconsumptionfallssufciently
rapidly  as it does for a widely-used specication of preferences featur-
ing a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution less than one  the
optimal health share rises over time. The rising health share occurs as con-
sumptioncontinuestoriseconsumptiongrowsmoreslowlythanincome.
The intuition for this result is that life is extremely valuable, and as we get
richer and richer, the most valuable channel for our spending is to purchase
additionalyearsoflife. Thisfundamentalmechanisminthemodelreceives
support from conventional estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution and from the recent work of Costa and Kahn (2003) and Hammitt
et al. (2000), who document that the value of a statistical life appears to be
rising faster than income over time.
Therecenthealthliteraturehasemphasizedtheimportanceoftechnolog-
ical change as an explanation for the rising health sharefor example, see
Newhouse (1992). We believe that our approach is complementary to the
technological view. For example, one could imagine that the production
function for health status is xt = f(ht) if f(ht) <  xt but is limited to  xt at
higher levels of spending. The discovery of new medical technologies then
shifts out  xt over time. Implicitly, then, we are assuming that the medical
technology shifts out rapidly enough so that this technology constraint is
not binding. In this respect, Jones (2003) considers the alternative extreme
where the technology constraint always binds.
What our model shows is that the technological explanation only works
if preferences accommodate the rising health share. The discovery of new
drugsandmedicalprocedurescanleadtheoptimalhealthsharetorisefrom
5 to 15 percent only if spending 15 percent on health is optimal from the40 HALL AND JONES
preference side. Both sides of Marshall's scissors must be in favor of high
health spending.
APPENDIX: SOLVING THE FULL MODEL
We solve the model with age-specic mortality numerically using the
following procedure.
1. Begin with a guess for per capita consumption at each date.
2. Guess a terminal value for the value function at each age in the nal
year of the simulation, 2095; we calculate v from the hypothesis that future
variables have the same value as has been projected for 2095.
3. Iterate backwards in time using the rst order condition to determine
health spending at each age and each point in time.
4. Use this time series for health spending by age to get health status, x
andhenceage-specicmortality. Iterateforwardonthepopulationequation
to get the size of the population at each age and date.
5. Finally,foreachperiod,thedistributionofthepopulation,theguessfor
percapitaconsumption,andthehealthspendinglevelimplyatotalquantity
of resources used, while the level of per capita income implies a total
quantity of resources available. Let d be the T  1 vector of discrepancies
in the resource constraint.
6. Use a nonlinear equation solver (fsolve in Matlab) to nd the time
series for consumption that makes the discrepancy vector equal to zero.
We use a similar procedure when we solve the complete model starting
in 2000 and match the observed values of v in 2000 from the technology
estimates. Westartwithguessesforbothcandbandcalculatediscrepancies
in both material balance and in the values of v in 2000. The nonlinear
equation solver then nds values for both c and b.
A complete solution takes about 5 seconds using a Pentium M processor.THE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 41
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